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THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE: 
NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON'T* 
John M. Burkoff** 
The Supreme Court has held that so-called "pretext searches" are 
unconstitutional abuses of the fourth amendment. 1 A pretext search 
is one where the justification proffered by the State for the search is 
legally sufficient, but where the searching officer was in fact searching 
for another, legally insufficient, reason. Similarly, a search is unconstitu-
tional if it is the product of a pretext arrest, i.e., where the justifica-
tion proffered by the State for an arrest is legally sufficient, but where 
the arresting officer was in fact making the arrest to search the arrestee 
incident to arrest for a reason which was legally insufficient to sup-
port the arrest. Perhaps it belabors the obvious to observe that pretext 
searches and arrests are unconstitutional because the facts and cir-
cumstances that the searching officer is de facto relying upon as justifica-
tion for such fourth amendment activity - as contrasted with those 
facts and circumstances which, it is later argued by the State, serve 
as the justification de jure - are insufficient to establish probable cause 
to arrest or search. 2 Hence, as the Hawaii Supreme Court has observed, 
"To condone . . . [pretext searches] would make a mockery of our 
basic constitutional protection. " 1 
Although the Supreme Court formally continues to recognize this 
pretext search doctrine, since 1978 the Court has made it increasingly 
difficult for defendants to establish the existence of such pretexts. I 
have previously "sounded the alarm" 4 on this subject, arguing that 
the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Scott v. United States5 served 
to endanger, if not to eviscerate, the pretext search doctrine. 6 The Scott 
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I. Occasionally, such searches are also referred to in the decisional law as "subterfuge searches." 
2. See generally Burkoff, Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982). The 
same point applies where an investigative stop and frisk is not justified by the appropriate quan-
tum of "reasonable suspicion." 
• 3. State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii 90, 94, 621 P.2d 370, 374 (1980). 
4. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 1.2, 
at 21 (Supp. 1984). 
5. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
6. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 72-84 (1982) [hereinafter cited 
as Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches]; Burkoff, supra note 2; Burkoff, The Court That Devoured 
523 
524 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:3 
decision appeared to mandate "objective" fourth amendment analysis, 
with a majority of the Court declaring irrelevant to such inquiry the 
subjective intent of searching police officers. This decision endangered 
the pretext search doctrine because it became doctrinally impossible 
(or, more accurately, irrelevant) for a criminal defendant to demonstrate 
the actual existence of a searching or arresting officer's (subjective) 
pretextual motivation. 
The Scott analysis appeared to signal that such subjective pretextual 
intent had to be proven objectively, i.e., through extrinsic, non-
testimonial evidence of pretext. Hence, even where the searching or 
arresting law enforcement officers conceded intentional wrongdoing 
in trial testimony or elsewhere, the defendant needed to establish that 
unconstitutional activity existed objectively as well. Or, to put the matter 
the other way around, search and seizure activity was simply not un-
constitutional unless the unconstitutional conduct was established 
objectively. 
Well, if one believes, as I do, that the Supreme Court "missed the 
boat" in Scott with their "objective" analysis, 7 now they've really gone 
and done it! In 1983, in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 8 the 
Court took a giant step further with respect to its de facto emascula-
tion of the pretext search doctrine. The Villamonte-Marquez majority 
not only continued to endorse the irrelevancy of subjective proof of 
pretext, it seemingly made it more difficult to prove pretext objective-
ly as well. 9 
This is an ominous development. To the extent that a majority of 
the Supreme Court can be seen as intimating, inadvertently or other-
wise, that fourth amendment restraints upon law enforcement officers' 
exercise of discretionary authority to search for (or seize) evidence are 
nonexistent as long as a lawful-sounding "cover story" for a given 
search or arrest can be concocted, the application of search and seizure 
law at suppression hearings is reduced to an unprincipled sham. Of 
what value are any fourth amendment "rules" if on those occasions 
when a criminal defendant proposes to demonstrate that they are be-
ing broken, the magistrate ref uses - or is not permitted - to listen 
or respond to the breach? 
One can only hope, to put it bluntly, that the Supreme Court ma-
jority in Villamonte-Marquez did not mean what it seemed to have 
said. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is precisely the case. In 
the same Term Villamonte-Marquez was decided, the Court also decided 
the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 
151, 190 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine]. 
7. See supra discussion in articles cited in note 6. 
8. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
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Texas v. Brown. 10 In Brown, the Supreme Court continued to recognize 
and respond to the problem of pretext searches. In other words, the 
Court still acts as if the pretext search doctrine remains vital, despite 
the apparent body blow delivered to it in Scott and Villamonte-Mar-
quez. The remainder of this Article elaborates upon the points sketched 
above, once again attempting to "sound the alarm" about the destruc-
tion of the pretext search doctrine, this time with just a bit more evidence 
- and a bit more volume. This Article also makes the case for a 
resuscitated pretext doctrine, one that would truly serve as an effective 
check against attempts to juridically "sweep under the rug" allega-
tions of police misconduct. 
I. Scott v. United States AND PRETEXT SEARCHES 
In Scott v. United States, 11 Justice Rehnquist concluded for a majority 
of the Supreme Court that the question of whether or not a fourth 
amendment violation exists in a given case should be resolved strictly 
on the basis of the objective reasonableness of the law enforcement 
officer's conduct in question, rather than on the basis of his or her 
subjective intent. 12 Moreover, Rehnquist added, "the fact that the of-
ficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the 
reasons which_provide the legal justification for the officer's action 
does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify that action." 13 
These propositions threaten the pretext search doctrine because of 
the clear difficulty they pose for a def end ant attempting to prove the 
existence of the alleged underlying pretext. As a pragmatic matter, "[i]f 
subjective intent is an inadmissible consideration on the issue whether 
or not there has been a substantive fourth amendment violation, what 
other way is there to expiore police officers' deterrable motivations 
for making a stop, an arrest, or a search?" 14 Granted, occasionally 
a searching or arresting officer's pretextual subjective intent can be 
demonstrated "objectively," i.e., on the basis of reasonable inferences 
10. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). 
II. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
12. A fuller discussion of this aspect of the Scott decision can be found in Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 72-75; Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 
6, at 181-190; I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2 at 19-21. Professor Lafave and I have both 
argued that the citations to precedent used to support this conclusion in Scott are inapposite. 
I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2, at 20-21; Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 
75-76 n.22. 
13. 436 U.S. at 138. 
14. Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 6, at 190; see also Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 81-82. Because the Burger Court's use of the exclusionary rule 
is theoretically, if not enthusiastically, premised upon the rule's presumed deterrent effect on 
law enforcement misconduct, it is particularly ironic to disclaim any interest in a police officer's 
assumedly deterrable reasons for acting. 
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from extrinsic rather than testimonial evidence. But even though that 
is the case, the Scott decision still poses a logical conundrum: if it 
is legitimate to demonstrate pretext indirectly through inference, why 
should evidence be deemed irrelevant and inadmissible which establishes 
the same pretext directly, e.g., from the searching officer's testimony 
as to what he or she was really doing and why he or she did it? 15 
The Supreme Court is appropriately reluctant to resolve such perplex-
ing doctrinal questions where their resolution is unnecessary. Moreover, 
to my mind, since it is desirable to avoid the destructive effects of 
Scott on the proof of pretexts, it should be noted that there is a conve-
nient way to avoid the difficult task of resolving this issue. It is at 
least arguable, if not readily apparent, that the relevant language in 
Scott on the question of the significance of a law enforcement officer's 
subjective intent is dictum. This language can fairly - and fortuitously 
- be viewed as dictum because Scott was not a decision where, in 
the majority's view, the resolution of fourth amendment questions ac-
tually turned on subjective intent. 
The Scott case involved the conduct of FBI agents monitoring a court-
approved wiretap. The court order authorizing the wiretap required 
that interceptions be "minimized" to those conversations lawfully sub-
ject to interception by statute. 16 The tapping agents conceded, however, 
that they, in the trial court's words, "made no attempt to comply with 
the minimization order of the Court but listened to and recorded all 
calls over the [subject] telephone. They showed no regard for the right 
of privacy and did nothing to avoid unnecessary intrusion.'' 1 7 Such 
failure to minimize electronic interceptions creates statutory and con-
stitutional problems requiring evidentiary exclusion. 18 Nonetheless, in 
this particular case, on the basis of the number and nature of the calls 
that were actually intercepted, although the agents' intent may well 
have been to violate the court-ordered minimization requirement when 
and if they could, the Supreme Court majority held that they did not 
violate it, essentially because they did not have the opportunity to 
minimize: 
In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging conspiracy with 
a large number of participants, even a seasoned listener would 
have been hard pressed to determine with any precision the 
relevancy of many of the calls before they were completed. A 
large number were ambiguous in nature, making characteriza-
tion virtually impossible until the completion of these calls. And 
15. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 111-16. See also infra note 79. 
16. 436 U.S. at 130. 
17. Scott v. United States, Nos. 74-2097, 74-2098 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) (quoted in Scott 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (bracketed material in original). 
18. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982); 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-59 (1967). 
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some of the nonpertinent conversations were one-time conver-
sations. Since these calls did not give the agents an opportunity 
to develop a category of innocent calls which should not have 
been intercepted, their interception cannot be viewed as a viola-
tion of the minimization requirement. 19 
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In other words, the specific calls intercepted by the FBI agents in 
Scott were, in the majority's view, "interceptible" as a matter of law. 
The FBI agents had not in fact acted upon their unconstitutional in-
tent. To complete the analysis then, the Scott majority "merely held 
that improper intent that is not acted upon does not render unconstitu-
tional an otherwise constitutional search. Since in pretext cases the 
searching officer has by definition acted on his unlawful intent, this 
reading of Scott harmonizes the case with the Court's continuing con-
cern about pretexts. " 20 
Professor Wayne Lafave, a leading commentator on search and 
seizure law, takes a different, albeit no less revisionist, view of the 
import of the Scott decision on pretext searches. Lafave contends that 
Scott was correctly decided, if not as a matter of law, as a policy matter, 
at least insofar as it makes impermissible the inquiry into a searching 
or arresting officer's subjective intentions. He reasons that "[u]nderlying 
the Scott rule . . . is the sound notion . . . that 'sending state and 
federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would 
produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.' " 21 
However, this conclusion does not, in LaFave's view, militate toward 
legitimizing pretext searches. Pretext searches and arrests are still -
and must continue to be treated as - . unconstitutional breaches of 
the fourth amendment. However, LaFave argues, in a case of pur-
ported pretext, 
· 19_ 436 U.S. at 142 (footnote omitted). 
20. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 83-84 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in 
Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REv. 223, 241 (1983). I have classified 
activity such as that at issue in Scott as searches undertaken with "latent bad intent," which, 
due to that latency, should be viewed as constitutional. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 
6, at 98-100; see also Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 562 (1968) (White, J., dissenting 
from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently' granted). This classificatory approach is 
vigorously criticized in Note, supra, at 257-60. 
21. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2, at 33, (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 
560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted)). 
But see in response Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 111-16: 
[T)he argument criticizing the use of a subjective approach is essentially an "impossi-
bility" argument. It is based on the belief that any judicial attempt to find an im-
proper intent on the part of a searching police officer is doomed to failure either because 
the courts are incapable of accurately assessing such motivations or because of the 
likelihood of pervasive police perjury. 
One is tempted to respond to this sort of criticism rehetorically by asking whether 
the difficulty of demonstrating the breach of a particular constitutional right should 
ever be a sufficient reason to bar courts from making the effort .... But there is 
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the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated 
from the usual practice . . . but simply that he did deviate. 
It is the fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling 
such cases which makes the officer's conduct arbitrary, and 
it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth 
Amendment violation . . . . 22 
Deviation from usual police practices, in other words, constitutes ob-
jective indicia of pretext and, when established, can suffice to establish 
a fourth amendment violation. Whether or not such deviation exists, 
in Professor LaFave's view, should be determined by deciding whether 
or not ''the Fourth Amendment activity [in question] 'was carried 
out in accordance with standard procedures" in the applicable law 
enforcement agency. 23 
Professor LaFave argues therefore, in support of the Scott decision, 
that inquiry into a searching or arresting officer's subjective intent is 
both inappropriate and unnecessary to establish pretext. In my view, 
a subjective inquiry can be useful - and may even be necessary -
to demonstrate what really occurred in a controverted episode of am-
biguous objective import. A subjective inquiry, however, was irrele-
vant to the decision in Scott because the majority concluded that 
whatever the searching officers' subjective intent, lawful or otherwise, 
they had not acted upon it. Nonetheless, in either case, using an analysis 
which reads the Scott opinion as containing dicta on the issue of sub-
jective intent, or using an analysis which views the Scott language as 
a desirable holding but inapplicable to objective demonstrations of 
pretext, the pretext search doctrine can and should be viewed as having 
survived the Scott decision, if a bit worse for the wear. 24 
II. United States v. Vi/lamonte-Marquez AND PRETEXT SEARCHES 
The effect of United States v. Vi/lamonte-Marquez 25 on the vitality 
a more pragmatic response to the "impossibility" argument: on numerous occasions, 
and in many different settings, courts have successfully managed to accomplish just 
this purportedly impossible task. 
Id. at 112-13 (footnote omitted). See also infra text accompanying note 79. 
22. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2 at 31; see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 434-38 (1974). 
23. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2 at 33 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364 (I 976) (emphasis in original)). Not all deviations suffice to establish unconstitutional con-
duct in and of themselves, however. See infra note 86. 
24. Even Professor LaFave concedes, however, that the pretext search doctrine is threatened 
by the Scott decision unless courts utilize "more reliable and feasible means of determining in 
a particular case whether or not the challenged arrest or· search was arbitrary." I W. LAFAVE, 
supra note 4, § 1.2, at 33. See also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.2, at 88. This point becomes 
critical in the Villamonte-Marquez setting. See infra text accompanying notes 39-60. 
25. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
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of the pretext search doctrine may be somewhat more telling than that 
of Scott v. United States. A six-justice majority in Villamonte-Marquez, 
in an opinion written, as was Scott, by Justice Rehnquist, concluded 
that random, suspicionless stops and boardings of vessels ''with ready 
access to the open sea" 26 are constitutional when made by law enforce-
ment agents for the purpose of furthering federal vessel documenta-
tion laws. 21 But the defendants in Villamonte-Marquez, convicted of 
various federal narcotics crimes after Customs officers boarded their 
vessel, the Henry Morgan II, subsequently discovered marijuana, argued 
that the search of their ship was not really made for the purpose of 
inspecton of its documents. Rather, they contended, ''the Henry Morgan 
II was boarded by the officers of a law enforcement patrol formed 
for the specific criminal investigatory purpose of locating boats loaded 
with marijuana.'' 28 
Justice Rehnquist summarily rejected this pretext argument in cryptic 
and cursory fashion in footnote three: 
Respondents ... contend ... that because the Customs officers 
were accompanied by a Louisiana State Policeman, and were 
following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel 
was thought to be carrying marijuana, they may not rely on 
the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's 
documentation. This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar 
situation in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-139 
... , and we again reject it. Acceptance of respondent's [sic] 
argument would lead to the incongruous result criticized by 
Judge Campbell in his opinion in United States v. Arra, 630 
F.2d 836, 846 (CAI 1980): "We would see little logic in sanc-
tioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but 
forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers. " 29 
A. Does Scott Support the Result in Villamonte-Marquez? 
In essence, the Villamonte-Marquez majority refused even to res-
pond to defendants' arguments of pretext, relying upon a bare cita-
tion to the Scott decision to justify its position. Accordingly, the Court 
did not substantively consider defendants' contention that the stopping 
and boarding of the Henry Morgan II was not in fact a document 
inspection but was, in actuality, a search for narcotics. But defendants' 
argument was certainly not a frivolous one. They prof erred in its sup-
26. Id. at 2575, 2582. 
27. The majority's conclusion that such suspicionless searches are constitutional in this set-
ting is criticized without regard to the claim of pretext in Burkoff, When Is A- Search Not A 
"Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. ToL. L. REv. 515, 541-56 (1984). 
28. Brief for the Respondents at 6, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. a. 2573 (1983). 
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3. 
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port both subjective30 and objective31 factors supporting their pretext 
contention. Why was this argument rejected without any considera-
tion of the merits? 
It is difficult to respond to this rhetorical question with any con-
fidence or facility. To the extent that footnote three might be seen 
as reflecting the majority's conclusion that a focus upon pretexts is 
either inappropriate or impermissible, it is clearly without supportive 
authority. The Scott decision may have weakened, but did not eradicate, 
the pretext search doctrine. Even if the Supreme Court's language in 
Scott, indicating that a searching officer's subjective intent is not to 
be considered in assessing whether or not a fourth amendment viola-
tion exists, is treated as holding rather than dictum, the Scott decision 
certainly did not purport to cut off defendants' right to present, at 
the bare minimum, "objective" evidence supporting their allegations 
" of pretext. 
The reason for adopting an objective approach to pretext analysis, 
in Professor LaFave's view (the Scott Court itself having offered no 
policy justification), is that assessing pretextual motivation objectively 
does not risk the supposed futility of a subjective inquiry. Moreover, 
an objective focus arguably highlights the questioned arbitrariness of 
the police conduct in question. Accordingly, deviation from a law en-
forcement agency's "standard procedures," again in Professor LaFave's 
view, violates the Scott "standard of objective reasonableness" and 
serves to establish pretext on the basis of unconstitutionally arbitrary 
conduct. 32 
The point of this digression into doctrine is simply to demonstrate 
that the Villamonte-Marquez majority in footnote three was not truly 
following that which can be gleaned from the language or thrust of 
the Scott decision, even though a citation to Scott was the only cited 
rationale for its dismissive conclusion on point. The Scott decision does 
not logically support a summary dismissal of a defendant's pretext 
arguments where that defendant has offered objective indicia of pretext. 
B. Objective Evidence of Pretext in Villamonte-Marquez 
The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez made it clear that their pretext 
argument relied both upon the trial testimony of the searching law en-
30. They pointed to, for example, trial testimony by the law enforcement officers involved 
that the vessel stop was based upon an informant's tip. See infra note 33. 
31. They pointed to, for example, the presence and participation of the state narcotics agent 
in the supposed federal document check. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
32. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. LaFave's "standard procedures" test for con-
sititutionality should be viewed, however, as a minimum requirement. Whether or not a given 
law enforcement activity follows standard procedures cannot inevitably dictate the constitutionality 
of the practice because a police department's "standard procedures" may, for example, themselves 
be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (District 
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forcement agents with respect to their subjective intent to board to 
search for narcotics33 and upon objective manifestations of that in-
tent. Such objective manifestations included, in the defendants' view, 
the fact that 
[t]he night before the boarding, customs agents had received 
an informant's tip that two vessels crewed by foreigners and 
loaded with marijuana were supposedly lying in the ... area. 
The agents immediately formed a patrol of customs agents and 
Louisiana state officials to conduct a search of the ... Chan-
nel for the specific purpose of locating these vessels. On the 
morning of the boarding in question, this patrol to locate boats 
loaded with marijuana resumed with the aid of members of 
the Louisiana State Police .... [T]he customs agents in the 
case at bar were engaged in an ongoing criminal investigation 
of alleged narcotics violations when they approached and 
boarded the Henry Morgan II. 34 
They also included the fact that 
State Police Officer Dougherty, a narcotics investigator, accom-
panied Customs Officer Wilkins when Wilkins boarded the boat. 
Dougherty's presence cannot be explained as a necessary inci-
dent to the conduct of a routine administrative document check 
.... In fact, the boarding authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) 
(1977) only authorizes "[a]n officer of the customs" to "go 
on board of any vessel ... and examine the manifest and other 
documents and papers . . . . '' The statute gives no such authority 
to a state police officer. 35 
What was the Villamonte-Marquez majority's response to these claims 
of objective manifestations of pretext? In one sentence, taken again 
from footnote three, the Court concluded "[t]his line of reasoning was 
rejected in a similar situation in Scott ... , and we again reject it. " 36 
of Columbia conceded its pedestrian "spot-check procedures" violated Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
I (1968)). See generally Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 107-11; Burkoff, Non-
Investigatory Police Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 681, 688-92 (1978). 
33. For example, the defendants in Villamonte-Marquez pointed out that "State Police Of-
ficer Segura testified that the members of the special investigative patrol 'were going to board' 
the respondents' sailboat, even had it not been violently rocked by the wake of a ship, pursuant 
to a decision made earlier by the officers and agents to board every vessel they found in the 
ship channel. (Record, vol. 3 at 239, 240)." Brief for the Respondents at 9, United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at JO (citations omitted). 
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3. 
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No, no, a thousand times no! The Scott decision only involved the 
issue of the significance of subjective evidence of pretext, and even 
then, arguably in dictum. 37 
C. The Need For the Pretext Search Doctrine in Vessel (and 
Vehicular) Cases 
The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez invoked the pretext search 
doctrine in what might be seen as classic objective fashion. One of 
the most common scenarios in which state appellate courts have held 
searches of vehicles and their occupants unconstitutional is where the 
search was made not by law enforcement officers involved in enforc-
ing traffic laws but rather by officers whose duties were primarily or 
exclusively the investigation of narcotics offenses. 38 In these situations, 
the objective indicia of a pretext arrest or search are substantial; it 
looks very much like the vice cop watched for a traffic violation strict-
ly in order to search for drugs, using the traffic violation simply as 
a convenient excuse to make the search. 
This is also precisely the sort of situation where LaFave's "standard 
procedures" analysis works best. 39 Narcotics agents generally do not 
make traffic stops as a matter of "standard procedure." Accordingly; 
pretext in this setting is not terribly difficult to observe. 40 And, as LaFave 
persuasively argues, "given the pervasiveness of such minor offenses 
and the ease with which law enforcement agents may uncover them 
in the conduct of virtually everyone, ... [if such pretexts are allowed,] 
there exists [on the part of law enforcement agents] 'a power that places 
the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer,' precisely 
the kind of arbitrary authority which gave rise to the Fourth 
Amendment.' ' 41 
37. Given the difficulty in reconciling footnote three with the pretext search doctrine, one 
federal Circuit Court of Appeals panel has simply, ingenuously, concluded that footnote three 
did not raise the issue of, and hence does not apply to, objective demonstrations of pretext. 
United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1554 n.13 (11th Cir. 1983). This conclusion, while 
desirable from my perspective, would appear to be wishful thinking given both the footnote's 
text and defendants' arguments. See infra note 65 for citations to cases reaching a contrary 
conclusion. 
38. See Burkoff, Inconsistent Exlusionary Doctrine, supra note 6, at 189 (collecting cases); 
see also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 10.8, at 388-89; 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.2, 
at 285-86; LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . .. Has Not ... Run Smooth," 
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 281-82. 
39. See supra text accompanying note 23. Professor LaFave made this argument in this set-
ting nearly two decades ago: "[i]t is not unduly difficult to ascertain in what cases this [pretext] 
situation exists .... [T]he assignment of the officers and their interest in the defendant as 
to other possible charges is convincing evidence. Moreover, the fact the defendant is actually 
arrested for the minor offense ... also exposes the true motives of the officer." LaFave, supra 
note 38, at 282. 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08. 
41. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2, at 32 (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 L. WROTH & 
H. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JoHN ADAMS 141-42 (1965)). 
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This same kind of narcotics search/pretext problem is unusually 
commonplace in the Villamonte-Marquez setting of supposed vessel 
documentation searches. Professor LaFave stresses the need to focus 
upon objective indicia of pretext because it is, in his view, a necessary 
part of a doctrine which might realistically serve to prevent arbitrary 
(hence, unconstitutional) police conduct. The greater the discretion a 
police officer has to decide when to search or seize, the more substan-
tial the risk of arbitrary action, 42 and the less useful the "Scott ap-
proach of disregarding 'the underlying intent or motivation of the 
officers involved. '" 43 "But," as LaFave critically pointed out even prior 
to the Supreme Court's decision in Villamonte-Marquez, "some courts 
have utilized the Scott theory even when considerable discretion exists. 
Illustrative are the cases holding motivation irrelevant notwithstanding 
the fact that Coast Guard Officers have vast discretion as to which 
vessels to stop for a safety and documentation inspection. " 44 In short, 
the Scott objective approach to fourth amendment analysis is less useful 
- and more threatening to privacy rights - in the vessel search set-
ting than in other settings where less risk exists of arbitrary police action. 
But, despite this problem, some courts have utilized objective analysis 
in this area anyway, with little regard for - or serious consideration 
of - the deleterious consequences of such a shortsighted position. 45 
Ironically, the principal decision LaFave cites disparagingly to 
illustrate this point is United States v. Arra, 46 the federal First Circuit 
Court of Appeals case quoted approvingly by the Supreme Court 
majority in Villamonte-Marquez footnote three, the footnote which 
is the object of much of this Article's critical scrutiny. 47 The quotation 
in question is as follows: "We would see little logic in sanctioning such 
[documentation] examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but for-
bidding them in the case of suspected smugglers. " 48 Used by the Supreme 
· Court in this context, however, this point could not be further from 
the mark. 49 The question at issue is not, as the Villamonte-Marquez 
and Arra majorities imply, the utility of some perverse rule of law 
which makes it more difficult to search suspect vessels than nonsuspect 
vessels. Rather, the question in every case is this: what is the justifica-
42. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2., at 33-34. 
43. Id. at 33 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 31-32. 
44. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.2, at 34 n.153; see also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, 
§ 10.8, at 165-66. 
45. See infra note 66. 
46. 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980). 
47. Lafave also cites State v. Richards, 388 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. I 980), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 879 (1981). 
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3 (quoting United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
49. I criticize Arra in some detail on the pretext issue elsewhere in one of those two-page 
footnotes that editors hate, but tend to create. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 
6, at 115 n.219. 
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tion for the search? It is hardly perverse to conclude that if the State 
is justifying its search as a document search, it must be a document 
search. That is what the pretext search doctrine is all about. If the 
State is searching for narcotics smugglers, then it must undertake lawful 
narcotics searches. A narcotics search, like any other investigatory 
search, needs to meet all of the ordinary fourth amendment re-
quirements, whether the standard at issue is "suspicion" to meet Terry50 
stop and frisk requirements or probable cause legitimizing a full scale 
search. 51 The Arra language in the Villamonte-Marquez context, accord-
ingly, while purportedly responsive to respondents' pretext arguments, 
totally begs the question. The "logic," in response to the Arra rhetorical 
question, in "forbidding [document searches] in the case of suspected 
smugglers," is that a check on documentation is not why such searches 
are being made. To argue that is to argue a lie. The searches are being 
made strictly to apprehend suspected smugglers, with a documenta-
tion check as the cover story. Where that is not the case, there is, of 
course, no pretext at issue, and document searches may be - indeed, 
are, after Villamonte-Marquez - perfectly legitimate. 52 Again and again, 
the point is that to find acceptable a justification for such searches 
which is duplicitous, in that it is not the real reason why a given search 
was actually made, perverts the whole notion that the fourth amend-
ment is capable of supporting workable restrictions on police 
misconduct. 53 If such restrictions work only where a clever prosecutor 
fails to come up with a good cover story for what has occurred, what 
deterrent effect can any fourth amendment rules be reasonably expected 
to have? 
Furthermore, as LaFave has pointed out, suspicionless vessel 
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l (1968). See Burkoff, supra note 32, at 682-88. 
51. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in an en bane opinion "[u]nlike a routine 
customs search or administrative search, [a suspicionless investigatory search) is not morally neutral 
- the purpose of the search is to uncover evidence of suspected wrongdoing, and contemporary 
jurisprudence requires that criminal investigations be carefully constrained to protect the rights 
of criminal suspects .... " United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en bane). See also United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1077 (5th Cir. 1978) (Roney, J., 
dissenting); id. at 1079 (Fay, J ., dissenting), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 
1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980). 
52. I have argued further that in a case of "mixed motives," where the searching or arresting 
officer has both cognizable constitutional and unconstitutional motives for his or her fourth 
amendment activity, the search should be viewed as constitutional. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 
supra note 6, at 103-04; see also United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 868-69 (3rd Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981) (vessel documentation search constitutional where "dual 
purpose" of document check and criminal investigation). My conclusion on this point has been 
criticized, however, as insufficiently deterrent of unconstitutional behavior on the part of the 
police. See Note, supra note 20, at 257-63. 
53. "Searches instituted as a mere subterfuge in order to seek evidence of crime should be 
deemed contrary to the fourth amendment, since they constitute an attempt to subvert the prob-
able cause requirement." Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment and 
Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REV. 725, 749 (1980) (footnote omitted); see also 
Burkoff, supra note 27, at 544 n.105. 
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documentation searches pose a uniquely high risk of law enforcement 
abuse of discretion. Other commentators, after canvassing the pre-
Villamonte-Marquez case law and reports of law enforcement prac-
tice, have made the same point, indeed, even more emphatically. One 
commentator has observed that 
[t]he truth of the matter ... is that [federal law enforcement 
agents] conduct many [safety and documentation] boardings 
motivated by a desire to discover narcotics smuggling. Officials 
often do not perform safety and documentation inspections 
because of a desire to deter noncompliance; they merely state 
that purpose and use it as an instrument to board a vessel 
"legally" with hopes of discovering narcotics violations. 54 
Another commentator has concluded 
the particular danger which the Supreme Court has emphasized 
in other administrative search cases - abuse of discretion -
is especially acute in the case of vessel inspections .... [T]he 
availability of authority to conduct purported safety inspections 
of vessels whose selection is totally in the discretion of the of-
ficer creates a potential for abuse of the safety inspection 
authority in order to search for evidence of crime. In fact, Coast 
Guard and Customs Service officials have openly admitted that 
their administrative search powers are regularly used to con-
duct searches for contraband. 55 
The Coast Guard itself is apparently quite candid about its improper 
investigatory intentions in this setting. As a federal Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals panel described the evidence presented by one defendant 
in a Coast Guard vessel boarding case: 
[I]nstructions [were] issued to Coast Guard personnel to the 
effect that boardings for administrative inspections may often 
produce the opportunity for observation of concealed contra-
band. The [instructions] included typical or possible hiding places 
on various types of vessels, and directions that inspections for 
compliance with safety regulations be conducted in such a man-
ner as to intrude into all these concealed spaces. 56 
54. Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537, 
1542 (1983). 
55. Note, supra note 53, at 743 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Comment, 
supra note 54, at 1542 n.37, 1560-61. 
56. United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 869 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
910 (1981) (emphasis added). 
536 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:3 
Rather than considering some solution to this recurring problem of 
pretext in vessel search cases, 57 the Villamonte-Marquez majority totally 
dismissed the claimed objective manifestations of defendants' pretext 
claim through inapposite citation to Scott. Instead of facing this issue 
head on, the Court implicitly legitimized the use of document searches 
as a pretext for engaging in suspicionless searches which are actually 
intended to support investigations of narcotics smuggling. Indeed, the 
Court was not the least bit reticent about making its underlying con-
cern about smuggling manifest, even though the whole point of the 
case was that the search at issue was (purportedly) not undertaken for 
that purpose. In defense of its conclusion that fourth amendment restric-
tions on police conduct were inapplicable to vessel documentation 
searches, the majority reasoned that "[t]he nature of the governmen-
tal interest in assuring compliance with documentation requirements, 
particularly in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers 
is great, are [sic] substantial .... " 58 
Although the bare aim of deterring or apprehending smugglers is 
a laudable goal, it cannot support a fourth amendment search or seizure 
in se; rather, fourth amendment requirements of reasonable suspicion 
for a Terry stop or probable cause for a full blown search must be 
compiled with when the reason for the search is not to check documents, 
but to search for smuggled contraband. 59 Accordingly, the failure of 
the Villamonte-Marquez majority to make even a cursory inquiry into 
the question whether or not the facts on record tenably supported a 
finding of pretext - objectively or subjectively - serves to emasculate 
dramatically the role of the pretext search doctrine in "keeping the 
State honest" by insuring that the reasons proferred in support of a 
given search or seizure are the same reasons which truly caused it to 
occur. 60 
57. It has been suggested that, to effectively respond to this problem of widespread arbitrary 
and pretextual vessel searchings, the 
courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that a purported administrative search 
was based on pretext whenever any one of a number of factors indicative of criminal 
investigatory motives exists. If, for example, the boarding team carries with it a drug 
identification kit, or the Coast Guard vessel involved is of a type not normally used 
for safety inspection, or the vessel is on patrol for general law enforcement, rather than 
safety inspection, the burden should be on the government to show that no pretext 
was involved. 
Note, supra note 53, at 749-50 (footnote omitted). 
58. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1983) (emphasis added). 
59. See Burkoff, supra note 27, at 553 n.144. 
60. The spectre of a prosecutor offering reasons in support of a search or seizure which 
he or she knows did not actually prompt the activity in question also raises questions concerning 
the ethical propriety of such advocacy. Certainly argument of this son would appear to be unethical 
under all prevailing or proposed professional ethical codes. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (amended 1981) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer 
should not ... [k)nowingly make a false statement of Jaw or fact."); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3.(a)(l) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false state-
ment of material fact or law to a tribunal."); THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 
SPRING 1984] Pretext Search Doctrine 537 
Ill. TAKING FOOTNOTES SERIOUSLY 
The reader may be tempted at this point to liken this critique of 
Villamonte-Marquez footnote three to the sort of analysis undertaken 
by "Kremlin-watchers." These analysts of Soviet behavior have often 
appeared to be excessively preoccupied with nuance and minutiae, in-
f erring massive shifts in Soviet domestic authority, for example, from 
such arcane details as precisely where various dignitaries stand at parades 
or funerals, or who is quoted most often or prominently in Pravda. 61 
Similarly, the reader might wish to point out at this juncture, "Hold 
on a moment - all we're really talking about here is one lousy foot-
note! Isn't it a bit premature - even a bit paranoid - to infer the 
collapse of principled fourth amendment doctrine, all stemming from 
this one cryptic footnote?" 
Well, gentle but irascible reader, the answer to your hypothesized 
query is both "yes" and "no." "Yes," because the world will (assumed-
ly) not end if footnote three is not immediately renounced and 
repudiated by the Supreme Court; as I later point out, fourth amend-
ment doctrine can still be "resuscitated," albeit with a bit of revisionist 
doctrinal tinkering. But the answer is also "no" to this question of 
apocalyptic vision; it is "no" because the destructive effects of foot-
note three of the Villamonte-Marquez opinion are already apparent 
on two levels. 62 
A. Impact of Villamonte-Marquez on Vessel Searches 
Villamonte-Marquez was a case of first impression in the Supreme 
Court. It resulted in the first and only Supreme Court decision answering 
the important question of precisely when a vessel can be detained, board-
ed, searched, and its occupants questioned, all under the presumptive 
Rule 3.7 (American Trial Lawyers Association, Revised Draft 1982) ("A lawyer shall not know-
ingly ... make a materially false representation to a court or other tribunal .... "). 
61. See, e.g., CIA Strives to Read Auguries From Russia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1984, at 
4, col. 6 (national ed.) ("The growing consensus that Mr. Chernenko will succeed Mr. Andropov, 
intelligence officials said, was based primarily on his selection as chairman of the funeral com-
mission and on his appearance at the head of the line when Soviet leaders passed by Mr. Andropov's 
body."); Russians Hope Andropov Aims Hold, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at 3, col. I (national 
ed.) ("[T]he fact that Mr. Gorbachev twice appeared standing next to Mr. Chernenko at Mr. 
Andropov's bier, and that they stood opposite each other at the front of Mr. Andropov's coffin 
as it was carried to the grave, took on new significance .... [Tihe tentative conclusion was 
that Mr. Chernenko might have won the leadership on a pledge to allow Mr. Gorbachev and 
others to press ahead with the economic measures started by Mr. Andropov.") 
62. Or, as Professor Lafave has observed of the response to his - and others' - critique 
of the good faith exeption to the exclusionary rule as "paranoid": "[This] suggests it may be 
well to reflect on the adage that even a person who is paranoid may have been followed." Lafave, 
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 
43 u. PITT. L. REV. 307, 358 (1982). 
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authority of the federal vessel documentation laws. 63 The issue of pretext 
searches of vessels boarded in inland waters had been frequently raised 
and resolved in a number of different ways by appellate courts prior 
to the decision in Villamonte-Marquez. 64 Accordingly, the Vil/amonte-
Marquez majority opinion - and footnote three - would now ap-
pear to settle the law on this point, namely that allegations of pretext 
will not be considered in this setting on the asserted basis of the Court's 
prior holding in Scott v. United States. However inappropriate this 
conclusion, as discussed earlier, it is apparently the law and, at least 
in the first few months after decision, it has been unflinchingly - even en-
thusiastically - accepted by some lower federal courts. 65 As one panel 
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted footnote three: ''The 
[ Villamonte-Marquez] Court there explicitly stated that an otherwise 
lawful document search does not become unlawful because the officer 
might in fact have been looking for drugs, not documents. " 66 Given 
this sort of unhesitating application, Villamonte-Marquez footnote three 
is obviously of tremendous and immediate significance to the inland 
waters-travelling public with respect to their pragmatic expectation of 
privacy from stops, boarding and search. 67 
B. Impact of Villamonte-Marquez Throughout the Law of Search 
and Seizure: State v. Bruzzese 
More significant, however, the second level of destructive effects 
engendered by footnote three is in its impact on the pretext search 
doctrine generally, i.e., in contexts other than the arguably idiosyn-
cratic - hence distinguishable - area of vessel searches. Footnote three, 
if interpreted broadly, makes it nigh unto impossible to establish pretext 
63. The Villamonte-Marquez analysis may also apply to Coast Guard safety inspections. See, 
e.g., United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1508 (11th Cir. 1983). 
64. See cases discussed in Note, supra note 53; Comment, supra note 54. 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 716 F.2d 935, 937-38 (1st Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Kincaid, 712 F.2d I, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1505-
08 (I Ith Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1554 n.13 (I Ith Cir. 1983) 
("nothing in [Villamonte-Marquez) suggests that reasonable suspicion is not required when the 
Customs officers' conduct, objectively assessed, indicates they did not stop and board the vessel 
to make a document inspection"). 
66. United States v. Kincaid, 712 F.2d I, 4 (1st Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Watson, 
678 F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982) (reaching same conclusion 
on basis of Scott, limited, however, to "this special context" of vessel searches). As discussed 
earlier, these assertions beg the question whether a pretext search is "otherwise lawful." See 
supra text accompanying notes 42-53. In the Fifth Circuit, there are a number of decisions justifying 
searches and seizures for narcotics without any pretense that the stop for a document check 
was lawful. See, e.g., United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 922 (1982); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 878 (1981); see also United States v. Alonso, 673 F.2d 335, 336 (11th Cir. 1982). 
67. The search would still have to "look like" a document search. As the Villamonte-Marquez 
majority noted, "it involves only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public 
areas of the ves~el, and inspect documents." 103 S. Ct. at 2581. Of course, items coming into 
plain view during such a search - as bales of marijuana did in Villamonte-Marquez - would 
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in any setting. 68 This fear of an overly broad application has, in the 
brief period of time since decision of Villamonte-Marquez, also become 
more than a mere hypothetical possibility. Consider, for example, the 
recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Bruzzese, 69 
handed down less than two months after the decision in 
Villamonte-Marquez. 
The key issue in Bruzzese was one of the focal issues of this Article, 
namely the significance of a searching officer's intent and actions in 
the determination whether or not the search in question was a pretext. 
The trial court in Bruzzese concluded, in part on the basis of the sear-
ching officer's testimony, that the actual reason for the search in ques-
tion was to investigate a burglary without probable cause to undertake 
such a search; it was not, the trial court held, a plain view search follow-
ing defendant's arrest on an outstanding contempt warrant, the ra-
tionale proffered to support the search by the prosecution. 10 The sear-
ching officer had made it clear in his trial testimony that ''his work 
did not normally entail 'contempt follow ups' ... and, furthermore, 
that 'normal' procedure in handling contempt warrants was not to ar-
rest but to call the person by telephone and ask him to appear at 
headquarters.'' 11 
The New Jersey Superior Court upheld the trial court's grant of defen-
dant's suppression motion on these facts, agreeing with the trial court 
that the search which produced the evidence sought to be suppressed 
was an investigatory search made incident to a pretextual arrest. 72 The 
Superior Court reached this conclusion by using a subjective approach 
to pretext analysis, adopting my view that "'bad faith' searches or 
seizures are unconstitutional even though they may appear to be ob-
jectively constitutional. " 73 However, the Court further noted, citing 
Professor LaFave's "objective" analysis discussed earlier, 74 that 
we find that the seizure here would be vulnerable even in the 
absence of a finding of subjective bad faith .... [as] the ar-
rest, whether or not characterized as subjectively 'pretextual,' 
be admissible into evidence if viewed inadvertently. On the other hand, the "inadvertence" ques-
tion raises the issue of pretext. See infra note I 13 and text accompanying notes 111-117. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-60 & 65-66. 
69. 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983). 
70. The trial court concluded that the search "was a purposeful inspection for investigative 
purposes," rather than "an inadvertant viewing by the police." State v. Bruzzese, 187 N.J. Super. 
435, 439, 455 A.2d 493, 494 (App. Div. 1982) (quoting trial court's opinion). 
71. State v. Bruzzese, 187 N.J. Super. 435, 438, 455 A.2d 493, 494 (App. Div. 1982). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 444, 455 A.2d at 497 (citing Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, and Amster-
dam, supra note 22). The latter citation is inapposite as Professor Amsterdam makes clear in 
the cited article that he is opposed to resolution of these issues on a subjective basis. Amsterdam, 
supra note 22, at 436-37 ("surely the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt when courts 
set out to bag the secret motivations of policemen in this context"). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23, 32 & 39-41. 
540 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:3 
was not effected in accordance with 'normal' procedures in the 
local police department. The seizure can fairly be characterized 
as the product of arbitrary police activity and thus in violation 
both of the Fourth Amendment and of N.J. CONST. (1947), 
Art. I, par. 7. 75 
In short, to the trial court and to the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Bruzzese was a classic case of pretext both on the basis of the searching 
officer's confessed subjective intent to search as a means of investigating 
a burglary (not to execute a contempt warrant) and on the objective 
basis of the officer's arbitrary deviation from "normal procedures" 
in following up contempt cases. 
1. Rejecting subjective bad faith- The New Jersey Supreme Court, 
however, reversed this Superior Court decision, with a majority of the 
Court emphatically disagreeing with both of the Superior Court's legal 
rulings. 76 The Bruzzese Supreme Court majority rejected, first of all, 
the subjective "bad faith doctrine, " 77 holding instead (citing Scott)1 8 
"that the proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a search 
and seizure is whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who 
undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his 
or her underlying motives or intent. " 79 In essence, the New Jersey 
75. 187 N.J. Super. at 445-46, 455 A.2d at 498. 
76. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983). 
77. Id. at 227, 463 A.2d at 329. 
78. Scott v. United States, 346 U.S. 128 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 11-24. 
79. 94 N.J. at 219-20, 463 A.2d at 325. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a subjective 
approach for a number of policy reasons, including the following: 
Were the Court to adopt the defendant's subjective rule, practically every search-
and-seizure case would require the court to engage in a costly and time-consuming 
expedition into the state of mind of the searching officer. Since motives are seldom 
apparent or vocalized, there is little reliable evidence of them. Even where motives 
are evident, the analysis may still pose problems. Complex creatures that they are, 
humans usually have several motives. 
A further weakness of the subjective approach is that it is neither reliable nor predic-
table. Appellate courts with views of human psychology different from those of the 
trial court would no doubt be tempted to second-guess the latter's assessment of the 
searching policeman's true intentions. 
[T)he subjective test ... places an unfair burden on Jaw enforcement authorities. Delving 
into the so-called ulterior motives of policemen penalizes officers who outwardly behave 
in a constitutionally appropriate way. Under this rule, a defendant subjected to an 
objectively reasonable search may receive a windfall because the searching police officer 
harbored bad thoughts, despite the fact that those thoughts did not alter the external 
effects of the officer's actions. 
Id. at 221-22, 463 A.2d at 326-27. 
There are a number of responses which can be made to these arguments. See generally Burkoff, 
Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 107-16, where I respond at some length. Briefly, however, 
it should be pointed out that (I) the fact that proof of a matter may be difficult and time-
consuming is no cause to disallow such proof where it is nonetheless available and relevant to 
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Supreme Court took the Scott language to be holding, not dicta, and 
applied it so as to make fourth amendment analysis in pretext cases 
wholly "objective. " 80 
More to the instant point, this conclusion, the majority continued, 
was "again endorsed" in Villamonte-Marquez. Footnote three, the 
Court ruled, ''clearly establishes that the pretext approach advocated 
by the dissent [, an expanded version of the Superior Court's approach,] 
is not the prevailing approach of our nation's highest court." 81 If there 
was any doubt then, in the majority's view, that Scott narrowed the 
permissible scope of inquiry in pretext cases, the Vil/amonte-Marquez 
footnote resolved that doubt entirely, at least in the minds of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court majority. Dissenting Justice Pollock forcefully 
argued, however, that on this point Villamonte-Marquez was sui generis: 
"[T]he [ Villamonte-Marquez] Court, in sustaining the search, relied 
heavily on the vessel's ability to head for the open seas, an ability not 
shared by the defendant's home." 82 The majority rejected this distinc-
tion, however, and treated the Villamonte-Marquez inroad into the 
pretext search doctrine as generic rather than idiosyncratic. 
2. Rejecting objective deviations- In any case, so much for this 
author's subjective pretext analysis! The Bruzzese majority did not re-
ject the pretext search doctrine; rather, it purported to adopt an "ob-
jective" approach to pretext analysis. The Superior Court also had, 
as an alternative holding, applied just such an analysis in Bruzzese, 
referring to LaFave's approach. 83 What did the New Jersey Supreme 
Court make of Professor LaFave's arguments? Well, in being rejected 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the company is certainly congenial. 
the constitutional inquiry; (2) "mixed motive" situations are not as difficult a doctrinal matter 
to deal with as the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests, see supra text accompanying note 52; 
(3) trial courts make subjective intent determinations every day in many, if not most, civil and 
criminal cases (e.g., Was the civil plaintiff or defendant negligent? Did the criminal defendant 
have the requisite mens rea?) - the task of assessing subjective intent is not only not bizarre 
nor exceptional, it is commonplace; and (4) acceptance of the criticism of a subjective approach 
proffered in the final paragraph above would have the effect of totally swallowing up any possibility 
of possessing an effective, enforceable fourth amendment. Essentially the majority's point boils 
down to the following: if we can give a good (albeit false) explanation for an officer's actions, 
it is irrelevant why he or she really acted. Such a policy makes a mockery both of any tenable 
fourth amendment deterrence theory undergirding the exclusionary rule (e.g., we will only deter 
duplicitious police officers teamed with bad prosecutors) and of notions of judicial integrity (e.g., 
we don't care what this officer really did as long as we can come up with an acceptable though 
false cover story). See also Note, supra note 20. 
80. As dissenting Justice Pollock pointed out, however, after adopting this supposedly objec-
tive approach, the majority, "(b]y relying on the police officers' alleged fear for their safety, 
[to justify the search,) ... ironically resorts to the officers' state of mind to justify the conclu-
sion that the search was reasonable." 94 N.J. at 247-48, 463 A.2d at 340 (Pollock, J., dissent-
ing). Claiming to use an objective approach and then relying upon subjective evidence is far 
from an uncommon judicial phenomenon. See infra text accompanying notes I 18-19. 
81. 94 N.J. at 221, 463 A.2d at 326. 
82. Id. at 249, 463 A.2d at 341 (Pollock, J ., dissenting). 
83. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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The Bruzzese majority was not overly fond of LaFave's views either, 
concluding: 
[w]e do not endorse the rule that a search shall be deemed 
unreasonable merely because a police officer deviates from his 
department's standard operating procedure. This theory is 
espoused by Professor LaFave . . . . The adoption of such a 
rule would discourage police officers from thinking and from 
exercising initiative. There are numerous situations that arise 
in law enforcement that are unique and call for a special 
response. It is impossible for a police department to envision 
and to develop standard operating procedures for all such 
situations. 84 
3. Examining a deviation "on its merits": What does this mean?-
If they didn't buy a subjective approach and they rejected LaFave's 
objective approach, what rule did the New Jersey Supreme Court apply? 
The answer: "[A] deviation from standard police practice should be 
examined on its merits to determine whether it constitutes an 
unreasonable act." 85 What does this mean? Literally, it would appear 
to indicate that some but not all deviations from standard police prac-
tice should be considered unreasonable and, hence, unconstitutional 
- a sensible enough result. 86 
But, in application, excluding consideration of the police officer's 
testimony as to his subjective intent and focusing, therefore, only on 
the question whether or not the searching officer's "abnormal" ap-
pearance to execute a contempt warrant was "on its merits . . . an 
unreasonable act," the Bruzzese majority held that it was not, because 
[u]pon issuance of a lawful arrest warrant, a police officer has 
the right to execute the warrant by arresting a defendant at 
his or her home. There is no legal requirement that before ex-
ecuting a valid arrest warrant a police officer must telephone 
the person sought and request that he voluntarily appear at head-
quarters [, as was this officer's "normal" practice]. 
The circumstances of the defendant's arrest disclose that the 
officers exercised a legitimate investigatory technique in a proper 
and reasonable manner. The hour of the arrest, 10:30 a.m., 
was reasonable . . . . Their entry into the house was entirely 
84. 94 N .J. at 228, 463 A.2d at 330. 
85. Id; see also State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152-53, 459 A.2d 1159, 1162-63 (1983) (search 
constitutional despite other defects if "overall objective reasonableness"). 
86. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 110 ("deviation from police depart-
ment procedures does not in all cases rise to the level of a constitutional violation"). 
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proper. They were polite, nonviolent, and entered only upon 
the consent of defendant's aunt. While defendant's aunt went 
upstairs to get him, the police officers remained downstairs. 
They did not explore any room of the house. When defendant 
came downstairs, [the arresting officer] promptly identified 
himself and placed defendant under arrest. 81 
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But, shades of Villamonte-Marquez footnote three, this approach 
is pure and simple issue avoidance! This certainly is not a pretext 
analysis. Indeed it loses sight of what is at issue. The Bruzzese majority 
essentially tells us that everything here can be explained away as perfectly 
lawful if we look at it from the right ''objective'' perspective! Execution 
of a contempt warrant can be a perfectly lawful thing to do and the of-
ficers can be seen as having executed it reasonably and politely. If we 
consider only selected facts and law in a clinical fashion, without looking 
for the truth as to what actually happened, it is not hard to justify 
this search. 
The majority approach is, in sum, the creation of an elaborate 
"superobjectivist" fiction. It has noting to do with reality or the justices' 
actual perceptions of the facts of the case. The majority knew better, they 
knew that in reality (or, as the Superior Court found it necessary to put 
it, under "the 'true facts' "), 88 there was much more to this scenario than 
their sanitized, supposedly objective account of the incident makes evident. 
Of particular significance here, the majority knew (1) that the arresting 
officer who subsequently accompanied the arrested defendant upstairs 
was in fact looking for evidence of another crime, he said as much, 89 
and they knew (2) that this officer - and the police generally - did 
not normally execute arrest warrants for contempt. 90 The former point 
is significant under my pretext analysis, 91 the latter under Professor 
87. 94 N.J. at 228-29, 463 A.2d at 330 (footnote omitted). 
88. 187 N.J. Super. at 446, 455 A.2d at 498. 
89. See supra note 70. 
90. See supra text acompanying note 71. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20. See also discussion of the "superobjectivist" 
approach to pretexts in Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 88-89. 
The majority did note in dictum that "even under the dissent's ... subjective analysis, the 
record does not reveal a bad faith effort to conduct a full-blown warrantless search." 94 N .J. 
at 230, 463 A.2d at 331. This conclusion is, at the same time, both extremely significant and 
inconsequential. It is significant because if the majority had ruled that the trial court's and Superior 
Court's legal analysis was proper but their factual conclusions did not square with that analysis, 
i.e., this was a "mixed motives" case, see supra note 52, there would be no controversy here, 
at least from my perspective. Indeed, two concurring justices took precisely this position. Id. 
at 240, 463 A.2d at 336 (Handler, J., concurring). A later New Jersey Supreme Court majority 
may, optimistically, adopt this concurring viewpoint and discard the rest of the majority opinion 
as dicta. 
The language quoted above is also inconsequential, however, because it is totally irrelevant 
that the searching officer did not intend "a full-blown" search if he intended to effect - and, 
as he conceded and the trial and Superior Courts concluded, did in fact effect - a limited in-
vestigatory search which was not itself justified under the fourth amendment. 
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LaFave's. 92 Under either view, however, the aim of the inquiry is finding 
the true justification for the search as efficaciously as possible in order 
that we be assured that this true justification was sufficient to support 
the fourth amendment activity which followed from it. But the Bruzzese 
majority was not interested in ascertaining the truth; they were asking 
what set of legal and doctrinal constructs suffice to help us avoid fac-
ing - and making decisions based upon - the (unpleasant) truth, i.e., 
that the police officer in question may have acted improperly. 
Such a visibly apparent result-orientation diminishes the possibility 
that the pretext search doctrine - and fourth amendment law in general 
- can serve as any real check on police misconduct. 93 What if the 
searching officer in Bruzzese also conceded in his testimony that the 
real reason he went to defendant's house - the only reason - was 
that defendant was black and he hated blacks? Under the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's "superobjectivist" approach, that concession would 
also be totally irrelevant to a pretext analysis. Indeed, what pretext 
analysis? We would know that the search was a pretext but there would 
be no way for defense counsel to prove it. 
The result of the New Jersey Supreme Court approach is the creation 
of a palpable sense of unreality- and worse. As dissenting Justice Pollock 
castigated his brethren in Bruzzese: 
In sustaining the search, the majority purports to adopt an 
"objective" analysis, the purpose of which is to avoid probing 
the psyche of the police when they make warrantless searches. 
Although an "objective" test has much to recommend it in 
many cases, like other rules of law, it has its own limits. In 
a case such as this, in which an arrest warrant is used as a 
pretext, the "objective" test can become an instrument of 
injustice. 94 
To the extent that Villamonte-Marquez footnote three is viewed as 
supporting or requiring the Bruzzese majority's approach or conclu-
sions, subverting the pretext search doctrine in cases other than those 
involving vessels with ready access to the sea, its impact is extremely 
- and broadly - destructive. 
IV. THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE LIVES 
All of the foregoing discussion notwithstanding, there is some substan-
tial evidence that the malign effect of both the Scott and Villamonte-
Marquez opinions on the pretext search doctrine may have been 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24, 32 & 39- 41. 
93. See generally Burkoff, supra note 27. 
94. 94 N.J. at 247, 463 A.2d at 340 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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unintended. The primary evidence supporting this conclusion is the sim-
ple fact that in other decisions, despite Scott and Villamonte-Marquez, 
the Supreme Court has treated the doctrine as if it retains vitality. 95 
Prior to Scott, the Supreme Court applied the pretext search doc-
trine explicitly and implicitly, in holding and in dicta, on numerous 
occasions. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 96 decided in 1932, for example, 
the Supreme Court flatly ruled that "[a]n arrest may not be used as 
a pretext to search for evidence. " 97 In Abel v. United States, 98 a 1960 
decision, the Court upheld the search of a suspected Soviet spy, rejec-
ting his argument that he was subject to a pretext arrest. However, 
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, premised this conclusion 
upon the trial court's finding that there was no "bad faith" on the 
part of the searching officers. 99 If "bad faith" had been found to have 
existed, Frankfurter continued, it would "reveal a serious misconduct 
by law-enforcing officers .... [that] must meet stern resistance by 
the courts.'' 100 In short, had the arrest which the government argued 
justified the search been pretextual, Frankfurter admonished, "our view 
of the matter would be totally different.'" 01 In another pre-Scott deci-
sion, Jones v. United States, 102 handed down in 1958, the Supreme 
Court was even clearer in its adherence to the pretext search doctrine. 
The federal government in Jones sought to justify a search before the 
Supreme Court on grounds that had not been previously advanced on 
appeal, namely that the search was incident to an arrest. Justice Harlan 
squarely and explicitly rejected this argument on pretext grounds, con-
cluding that ''the record fails to support the ... theory now advanced 
by the Government. The testimony of the federal officers makes clear 
beyond dispute that their purpose in entering [defendant's home] was 
to search for distilling equipment, and not to arrest [the defendant]." 103 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 104 decided in 1976, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of so-called "automobile inventory" 
searches, but, notably, only so long as such searches were not, in reality, 
"a pretext concealing an investigatory ... motive.'' 105 Other pre-Scott 
95. For additional discussion of many of these decisions, see l W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § l.2(g), 
at 21-31; Note, supra note 20, at 243-44. 
96. 285 U.S. 452 (1932). 
91. Id. at 467. 
98. 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
99. Id. at 226. 
100. Id. 
IOI. Id. at 230. 
102. 357 U.S. 493 (1958). 
103. Id. at 500. It is also notable that the Jones Court utilized a subjective rather than an 
objective pretext analysis. For a further discussion of Jones, see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 
supra note 6, at 79-81. 
104. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
105. Id. at 376 (footnote omitted). There are many state appellate decisions handed down 
after the decision in Scott applying the pretext search doctrine in the Opperman setting, holding 
unconstitutional investigatory searches argued by the State to be inventory searches. See Burkoff, 
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opinions, authored by various Supreme Court justices, reflect a similar 
fixed adherence to the four corners of the pretext search doctrine. 106 
After Scott, the Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the doc-
trine in various decisions. In Colorado v. Bannister, 101 for example, 
the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a police officer's seizure of 
suspected stolen goods discovered in plain view after the officer stop-
ped the defendant's car for a traffic violation. But the Court made 
it clear that it reached this result of constitutionality where "[t]here 
was no evidence whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic 
citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about 
the [car's] occupants." 108 Similarly, in Steagald v. United States, 109 the 
Court refused to permit law enforcement officers to search for the sub-
ject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party unless they 
possessed a search warrant or were acting under a suitable exception 
to the warrant requirement. One of the principal reasons for this ruling 
was the fear of pretext searches. Specifically, the Court expressed its 
belief that adoption of a contrary rule "would create a significant poten-
tial for abuse ... [in that] an arrest warrant may [otherwise] serve 
as the pretext for entering a home in which the police have a suspi-
cion, but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking 
place." 110 
More recently still, indeed decided in the very same Term as 
Villamonte-Marquez, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Scott and 
Villamonte-Marquez majority opinions, wrote a plurality opinion in 
Texas v. Brown, 1 11 which continued to take cognizance of the 
significance and import of the pretext search doctrine. In Brown, a 
majority of the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless seizure and subse-
quent search of a knotted, opaque balloon ultimately found to con-
tain heroin after it was viewed in defendant's hand by a police officer 
who had just made a lawful stop of defendant's automobile. 112 A 
supra note 2 (collecting cases); Note, supra note 20, at 225-26 n.14 (collecting cases). 
106. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (Miranda 
warnings will rarely be sufficient to dissipate the taint of a pretext search); Wainwright v. City 
of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606-07 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (evidence obtained through 
a pretext arrest should be subject to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (pretext arrests one of the abuses Framers sought 
to curb); see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978). 
For further discussion of these pre-Scott cases see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 
6, at 78-81; Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 6, at 189-90; I W. LAFAVE, 
supra note 4, § 1.2, at 26-31. 
107. 449 U.S. I (1980) (per curiam). 
108. Id. at 4 n.4. 
109. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
110. Id. at 215; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40-41 (1979) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
111. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). 
112. Id. at 1537 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id. at 1544 (White, J., concurring); id. 
at 1544 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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plurality of four, Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, White, and 
O'Connor, concluded that the balloon was lawfully seized under the 
"plain view doctrine" because its discovery was "inadvertent." 113 
Inadvertence, in the Supreme Court's view, was established by the 
fact that the defendant had failed to prove that an expectation on the 
part of the searching officer existed that the stop of defendant's 
automobile would produce this evidence. 114 If this approach sounds 
familiar, it is because, in essence, the inadvertence requirement was 
treated as a way of negativing a defendant's allegations of pretext with 
respect to a plain view seizure. Or, as the plurality stated the point, 
quoting from an earlier plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 115 for a plain view search to be constitutional, "the of-
ficer must discover incriminating evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to 
say, he may not 'know in advance the location of [certain] evidence 
and intend to seize it,' relying on the plain view doctrine only as a 
pretext.'' 116 
In short, the balloon in Brown was seized constitutionally because, 
inter alia, the law enforcement conduct which brought it into "plain 
view" was not pretextual. As Justice Rehnquist specifically applied the 
pretext search doctrine to the facts in Brown: 
The circumstances of this meeting ... give no suggestion that 
the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics viola-
tion might be uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a check 
for drivers' licenses. Here, although the officers no doubt had 
an expectation that some of the cars they halted ... [in this]-
"medium" area of narcotics traffic ... would contain nar-
cotics or paraphenalia, there is no indication in the record that 
they had anything beyond this• generalized expectation. Likewise, 
there is no indication that [the searching officer] had any reason 
113. The "inadvertence" element of the "plain view doctrine" was taken from the plurality 
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.), 
and was applied arguendo by the plurality in Brown without a formal ruling on its status as 
a sine qua non of the "plain view doctrine." See 103 S. Ct. at 1543. A majority of the Court 
in Brown, however, did not question the "inadvertence" requirement. Justice Powell, joined 
by Justice Blackmun, observed that there is "no reason at this late date to imply criticism of 
[this requirement] .... It has been accepted generally for over a decade." Id. at 1544 (Powell, 
.J ., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
cited the Coolidge plurality as authority without comment. Id. at 1546. Since the inadvertence 
requirement received the explicit or implicit support of a majority of the justices, the discussion 
of this issue in the plurality opinion should be seen as a necessary component of the decision. 
114. See infra text accompanying note 117. 
115. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1540 (quoting 403 U.S. at 470) (bracketed material from Brown opinion). 
There had been a good deal of discussion in the lower courts of what the inadvertence require-
ment should cover in terms of law enforcement officers' prior expectations. See, e.g., United 
States v. Liberti, 616 F.2d 34, 36-38 (2d Cir. 1980); id. at 38 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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to believe that any particular object would be in Brown's glove 
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The 'inadvertence' 
requirement of 'plain view,' properly understood, was [, ac-
cordingly,] no bar to the seizure here. 1 1 7 
Application of the pretext search doctrine, the necessity of a finding 
that the plain view search at issue was not pretextual, was, therefore, 
a dispositive consideration in the decision of Texas v. Brown. Clearly, 
in one form or another, the pretext search doctrine lives. 
V. RESUSCITATING THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE 
How does one reconcile Scott, Villamonte-Marquez footnote three, 
and their destructive effect on the pretext search doctrine, with Texas 
v. Brown and all the earlier Supreme Court decisions which appear 
with equal facility to support and apply it? Indeed, one might inquire 
further, how does one reconcile the objective approach to fourth amend-
ment inquiries, including pretext analysis, seemingly mandated by Justice 
Rehnquist in Scott with Justice Rehnquist's resolution of the Brown 
plain view inadvertence/pretext issue on the basis of the searching 
officers' (subjective) knowle_dge, intent, beliefs, and expectations? 118 
There are a number of different ways to answer these questions, but 
they lead me to a single conclusion. 
That conclusion is that the Court must recognize (continue to 
recognize?) that a criminal defendant should be entitled to offer both 
objective and subjective evidence of pretext in those cases where such 
proof is useful and available. Objective evidence of pretext must be 
permitted, at the very minimum, else fourth amendment decisional law 
is rendered wholly ineffective to respond to police misconduct when 
the state is able to contrive an appropriate legal justification to ac-
count for the appearance (but not the reality) of a questioned search. 
Professor LaFave has ably marked out what should be the minimum 
allowed a criminal defendant alleging pretext: the opportunity to prove 
the arresting or searching officer's deviation from standard police prac-
tices, thus (objectively) establishing the existence of pretext. Notably, 
in support of this proposition, one panel of the federal Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has recently concluded, contrary to my arguments 
about the detrimental impact of Villamonte-Marquez footnote three 
117. 103 S. Ct. at 1543-44. Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the finding of in-
advertence. Id. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring). 
I 18. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17. In similar inconsistent fashion, a plurality 
of the Court in Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983) endorsed an "objective" ap-
proach to the question when a fourth amendment "seizure" of a person takes place, but then 
r~solved the seizure question in that case in large part upon the basis of "the testimony of the 
officers at the suppression hearing ... indicating that had [the defendant] refused to consent 
to a search of his luggage, the officers would have held the luggage and sought a warrant to 
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on objective proof of pretexts, that the Villamonte-Marquez Court did 
not rule out the possibility of demonstrating pretext objectively in this 
fashion. 119 
However, the availability of this sort of objective argument is not 
enough. Not only is fourth amendment doctrine threatened, the whole 
fabric of the law is threatened, when the law permits - even encourages 
- the state to legitimize its otherwise unconstitutional acquisition of 
evidence on the basis of a ·lie. That is why a defendant must also be 
offered the opportunity to demonstrate pretext subjectively, where the 
objective evidence is otherwise unilluminating. 120 
To make this point clearer, consider the Texas v. Brown facts with 
one difference - the searching officer states on the record: "The real 
reason - the only reason - I stopped Brown's car was to search for 
narcotics, not to check drivers' licenses. I knew I didn't have the right 
to stop the car for that reason but I just didn't like Brown's looks!" 
If we take the Scott decision and its reaffirmation in Villamonte-Mar-
quez literally, this subjective "concession" of wrongdoing would be 
irrelevant, the constitutionality of the search would still turn only on 
the significance of other, so-called "objective" factors. This is exactly 
what happened in the New Jersey Supreme Court's unfortunate deci-
sion in Bruzzese. 121 
But what kind of objectivity is this, objectivity which ignores - even 
flaunts - the obvious truth? One would assume that a concern about 
discovering the truth - the New Jersey Superior Court's "true facts" 122 
- is precisely why Justice Rehnquist focused his Texas v. Brown analysis 
of plain view inadvertence on the searching officer's "intent" and "ex-
pectations." If a police officer's intent was strictly to act unconstitu-
tionally under the fourth amendment and if an objective view of the 
episode in question confirms that that is what he did in fact, 121 that 
authorize the.search." Id. at 1327. As another example of this common judicial inconsistency 
in approach, a First Circuit Court of Appeals panel has noted that plain view inadvertence can 
be established objectively, United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 560 (1st Cir. 1982), then decided 
the issue of inadvertence in partial reliance upon the searching officer's subjective testimony. 
Id. at 559. See also supra note 80 (New Jersey Supreme Court majority in Bruzzese takes same 
inconsistent approach). 
119. See United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1554 n.13 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[N]othing in 
( Villamonte-Marquez) suggests that reasonable suspicion is not required when the Customs of-
ficials' conduct, objectively assessed, indicates they did not stop and board the vessel to make 
a document inspection."). But see contra, e.g., United States v. Kincaid, 712 F.2d I, 3-4 (1st 
Cir. 1983). 
120. Where the objective evidence clearly demonstrates pretext, a subjective showing is un-
necessary. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at I 16. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 69-94. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 88. The fact that a court would find it necessary 
to contrast the "true facts" with the facts argued by the state as supporting a search graphically 
demonstrates the doctrinal devolution in this area of the law. 
123. An improper subjective intent not acted upon should not lead to a finding of unconstitu-
tionality. That - and only that - is what the Scott decision should be seen as establishing. 
See supra text accompanying notes 15-20; see also Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983) 
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is precisely how courts should view his conduct. Truthfully. Not like 
the New Jersey Supreme Court majority in Bruzzese, straining to "ob-
jectively" rationalize away questionable police conduct. 124 Indeed, at 
a time when the exclusionary rule is regularly limited in application 
by a majority of the Supreme Court to those situations where deter-
rence is seen as incrementally maximized, 125 what more optimal setting 
for its application than one where a searching officer's clear and con-
fessed "bad faith" is established on the record? 
In this light, to effectively resuscitate the pretext search doctrine, 
the Supreme Court's approach to pretexts in Villamonte-Marquez foot-
note three should, frankly, be disregarded. It can be - and should 
be - viewed as aberrational, as unintentional, or simply as ill-
considered. To take it as implying anything else threatens not only 
the pretext search doctrine, but the credibility of the fourth amend-
ment itself as an effective deterrent to police misconduct. 
(plurality opinion) ("the fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and pro-
ceeded on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State from justifying 
Royer's custody by proving probable cause .... "); United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 
1300 (5th Cir. 1981) (no constitutional violation where Coast Guard Commander in vessel search 
intended to act without probable cause, but did not). 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 76-94. 
125. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
